“Move to Enhance Spy Chief’s Clout,” by Siobhan Gorman, The Wall Street Journal (5/22/2010)
Mark Lowenthal, a former senior intelligence official, said the directors of national intelligence to date are “three of the smartest men I ever had to work with or for.” If none have been able to make it work, he said, “you have to begin to ask yourself why the job doesn’t function well.”
“After Blair, the question is asked: ‘Is it the job?’” by Greg Miller and Walter Pincus, The Washington Post (5/22/2010)
“The DNI doesn’t have any authority to make things happen,” said Mark M. Lowenthal, a former senior CIA official and the chief executive of the Intelligence & Security Academy. “If you look at who we’ve had, we’ve been extremely lucky in the people who’ve accepted the job. Three of the brightest people I’ve ever met. But they can’t make the job work. At a certain point, you have to ask yourself: Is it the job?”
“Dispute Over France Was Factor in Intelligence Rift,” by Scott Shane, The New York Times (5/22/2010)
Mark M. Lowenthal, a former assistant director of the C.I.A., said the relative weakness of the intelligence director position was especially frustrating to Mr. Blair, who had powerful positions in the military, notably as head of United States Pacific Command.
“Denny had been commander of the largest military command in the world,” Mr. Lowenthal said. “And then he took this job where anyone who wanted to ignore him basically could do it.”
“A Year of Terror Plots, Through a Second Prism,” by Scott Shane, The New York Times (1/13/2010)
But even that near miss, said Mark M. Lowenthal, assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency for analysis from 2002 to 2005, may offer indirect evidence of the enemy’s diminished strength, compared with the coordinated attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
“Sending one guy on one plane is a huge step down,” Mr. Lowenthal said. “They’re less capable, even if they’re still lethal. They’re not able to carry out the intense planning they once did.”
“Let’s not become our own worst enemy,” Mark Lowenthal, McClatchy (1/15/2010)
Everyone should take a deep breath and stop flapping about the “failure” to identify Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as a likely terrorist. What went wrong — and what’s gone right?
Yes, there were disparate pieces of information that — if they were put together correctly and on time — might have sounded an alarm about Abdulmutallab before he got on Northwest Flight 253 in Amsterdam. Were they, however, of sufficient magnitude to force agencies to focus on him? One of the many misconceptions swirling around this incident is the nature of intelligence analysis, and especially analysis about potential terrorists.
“La première crise du renseignement du président Obama,” by Mark M. Lowenthal, Le Figaro (10/10/2010)
Le Président Obama continue d’avoir une relation décidément ambivalente avec le renseignement américain. La dernière preuve en est le langage extrêmement rude qu’il a employé pour décrire la façon dont le renseignement a « échoué » dans le partage de ses informations, en permettant à Umar Abdulmutallab d’embarquer à bord d’un avion à destination des États-Unis.
“Making Them Talk,” by Tim Starks, Congressional Quarterly (10/01/2010)
“You could triple the size of the NCTC and still have the same problem,” said Mark Lowenthal, who served as vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 2002 to 2005. “We’re in a war. I don’t want to sound cold about this, but casualties occur in wars. The idea that you can fight a campaign and never suffer consequences is delusory.”
“Obama Details New Policies in Response to Terror Threat,” by Jeff Zeleny and Helene Cooper, New York Times (1/7/2010)
“You can’t ask analysts to think faster,” said Mark M. Lowenthal, who was the C.I.A.’s assistant director for analysis from 2002 to 2005. “And the president’s solution to have analysts share more information sooner is only going to exacerbate the problem that got us into this flap in the first place.”
“CIA Operatives Killed by Double Agent, Ex-U.S. Official Says,” by Jeff Bliss, Bloomberg.com (1/6/2010)
“This has to be one of the highest losses in a single bombing” in the agency’s history, said Mark Lowenthal, a former CIA assistant director for analysis and production. “To lose seven at one time, that’s a bit staggering.”
“We have to rethink that part of the program,” said Lowenthal, now president and chief executive officer of Intelligence & Security Academy LLC in Reston, Virginia. “These people are dedicated” to their cause, making it hard to gain their loyalty.
“CIA Workers Killed in Afghanistan as U.S. Steps Up Spying Role,” by Viola Gienger, Bloomberg.com (01/01/2009)
“This has to be one of the highest losses in a single bombing” in the agency’s history, said Mark Lowenthal, a former CIA assistant director for analysis and production. “To lose seven at one time, that’s a bit staggering.”
The Taliban claimed responsibility, Agence France-Presse reported earlier. The chief of the CIA base, a mother of three, was among those killed, according to the Associated Press, which cited former agency officials.
CIA officers operating from such a base regularly mingle with the local population as part of their job, so it wouldn’t be unheard-of that an attacker could slip through security, Lowenthal said.
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